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The	volatile	nature	of	social	trust	–	the	case	of	Croatia	and	Slovenia	
Abstract		
The countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have to varying degrees been struggling in their 
transition to market economies and democracy. Social trust is often argued to be a crucial lubricant 
in solving collective action problems and thus building and maintaining well-functioning 
institutions. Therefore building and maintaining social trust seems crucial for the countries in CEE 
struggling with transition. Existing research on social trust is mainly conducted in a western 
context, and there is a clear need for research to focus on social trust in CEE - an endeavour which 
this article undertakes. The article conducts a comparative study of the development of social trust 
in Croatia and Slovenia. In spite these countries’ common Yugoslavian heritage they show a 
remarkably diversified development in social trust over a rather short timespan (1996-2007). The 
two cases thus provide good cases for examining dynamic or rather short term effects influencing 
social trust at the aggregated level, which in existing literature is assumed to be rather stable. The 
article synthesises arguments from existing theory on social trust and claims that the level of social 
trust could be heavily influenced by the development of public sentiment in a given context. The 
development of social trust in Croatia and Slovenia thus correlate with factors as the sense of trust 
and corruption among politicians, public officials and public institutions, the general economic and 
social development in the country as well as the general sense of optimism at the individual level. 
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Introduction	
Social trust is a phenomenon, which has been given a lot of attention in recent years. There are two 
reasons for this: firstly there is a widespread consensus, that high social trust in a society generates a 
lot of positive outcomes. Social trust can be seen as: “the lubricant that helps overcome collective 
action problems and that fosters productive social exchanges” [Rothstein and Stolle 2001: 2]. 
Social trust thus spurs easier corporation and lower transaction costs, which again spurs economic 
growth, better functioning governments and a higher level of happiness in the society [Rothstein 
and Stolle 2001; Kuzio 2001; Albrekt Larsen 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Uslaner 2001; 
Putnam 1993]. Secondly it seems clear, that a great deal of variation in social trust exist between 
different countries, regions and cities but also between different groups in a society [Albrekt Larsen 
2007; Rothstein and Stolle 2001; Delhey and Newton 2005]. Since social trust appears to lead to 
many positive outcomes for a society, but also varies between them, it is important to examine the 
concept. 
Social trust can be defined as: “the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, 
if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible” [Delhey and Newton 2005: 
311]. It is therefore important not to confuse social trust with particularized trust, which is a 
personal face-to-face trust in people we know. Social trust denotes a trust in people in the society in 
general1, and thus people we don’t know [Delhey and Newton 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 2001; 
Uslaner 2001]. The concept is often measured by the standard question: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
                                                            
1 Which is why social trust sometimes also is called generalized trust. Others again refer to the concept as interpersonal trust or 
simply social capital. 
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people?” [Delhey and Newton 2005: 314; Uslaner 2001: 9]2. This question will also be used as the 
measure of social trust in this paper. 
Research on social trust is often performed in a western context. Putnam’s classical works of 1993 
and 2000 are thus investigations of the civil societies in Italy and USA. A more institutional 
tradition focuses in particular on the universalistic/social-democratic Scandinavian welfare states 
and their effects on generating social trust3. Contrary to this, the amount of research about social 
trust in the countries in Central- and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still limited. The former socialist 
systems in these countries are often described as having virtually destroyed social trust [Deacon 
1993; Cerami 2006]. Table 1 below shows the percent of respondents answering “most people can 
be trusted” in three different cross-country surveys done in CEE. 
                                                            
2 The question has been found to tap the concept of social trust quite well, especially in a Western and European context [Lolle and 
Torpe 2011]. In a factor analysis Uslaner [2001] finds that the classic trust question loads strongly with questions about trust in 
strangers, but not on trust in friends and family. 
3 See for example: Albrekt Larsen 2007; Rothstein 1998, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle 2001; Rotshtein and Uslaner 2005. 
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Table 1. The development in social trust in CEE from 1996 to 2007 
“Most people can be trusted” WVS 1996 EVS 1999 ISSP 2007 
Croatia 25 % 21 % 19 % 
Slovenia 16 % 22 % 39 % 
Czech Republic 29 % 25 % 50 % 
Poland 18 % 19 % 26 % 
Latvia 25 % 17 % 34 % 
Rumania  19 % 10 %  
Hungary 23 % 22 %  
Bulgaria 29 % 27 %  
Bosnia-Herzegovina 29 %   
Serbia 30 %   
Slovakia  16 %  
Lithuania  26 %  
Estonia  24 %  
The social trust scores in table 1 are based on: Variable v27 from World Values Survey Eastern Europe 1996, variable v66 from 
European Values Study 3. Wave 1999 and variable v57 from ISSP Sport and Leisure 2007. v57 from ISSP 2007 was originally an 
ordinal scaled variable with four categories. It has been dichotomized, and the shown score reflects the sum of the two positive 
categories.  
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Table 1 shows that data on the social trust question for a lot of countries in CEE are not available in 
all three surveys. Of the five countries for which this data exists Croatia is the only one having a 
negative development in the social trust score. Opposing this Croatia’s neighbour country Slovenia 
has the lowest score in 1996 and the second highest in 2007. The country more than doubles its 
score, something which no other country does. It should be noted that it can have an effect that the 
2007-score stems from a dichotomized ordinal scaled variable: All countries except Croatia show a 
remarkable rise in the social trust scores from 1999 to 2007. Hence one could suspect that the 
dichotomization has caused a positive bias in the 2007-score. Taking this into consideration 
Croatia’s negative development seems even more remarkable.  
Croatia and Slovenia share a common Yugoslavian heritage and they are both catholic countries.  
Despite this quite similar starting point, the two countries are the ones with the most diversified 
development of social trust in the table. This constitutes a puzzle, and this paper will make the 
argument, that the diversified development in social trust in the two countries coincides with a 
diversified development in public sentiment. It is furthermore argued that public sentiment cannot 
be measured directly with individual-level variables. The argument is that the general character of 
the phenomenon calls for context-specific explanations based on the interaction of several factors or 
variables [Pfau-Effinger 2009: 27-28]. 
Hence the structure of the paper is as follows. First it will be shown, that the diversified 
development in social trust in the two countries cannot be subscribed to individual-level factors. 
The development encompasses the two societies as a whole; consequently the explanation for the 
developments must lie in the broader context. Secondly the theoretical argument of the paper will be 
put forward. It is argued, that the diversified development in social trust in the two countries 
coincides with a diversified development in public sentiment. It is furthermore argued, that the 
public sentiment is an effect of the interaction of the social, economic and political development. 
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Survey indicators for the sense of trust and corruption among politicians, public officials and public 
institutions and optimism as well as context descriptions can trace this interaction and thus the 
development in public sentiment. Thirdly therefore empirical material in the form of context 
descriptions and survey indicators will be investigated in order to render our claim. A conclusion 
will sum up the findings and elaborate on the consequences for the understandings of the concept of 
social trust. 
Who	changes	their	social	trust	score	–	disaggregating	the	dependent	variable	
In this section it will be asked whether the diversified development in social trust in Croatia and 
Slovenia 1996-2007 is a result of movements within all groups of society, or if some groups stand 
markedly out from the national average. This will be done by looking at age-groups, employment 
status-groups and different educational groups4.  The argument for this section is more specifically 
that if the development in the two countries can be subscribed to individual/micro-level 
explanations, one can expect different paths of social trust for various social groups. On the other 
hand if the development in the two countries seems to encompass all relevant social groups it is 
likely that the explanation lies in macro-level phenomenons.  
First we will look at age-groups in Slovenia and Croatia and their level of social trust.  
                                                            
4  We would have looked income-groups as well, however data is unfortunately missing.   
  9
Figure 1. Social trust among age-groups in Slovenia and Croatia 
Slovenia Croatia 
Figure 1 shows the level of social trust among different age groups in Slovenia and Croatia in 1996, 1999 and 2007. Source: WVS 
1996, EVS 1999 and ISSP 2007. 
 
At first glance figure 1 shows, that the development between different age-groups in the two 
countries is diversified. The development in Slovenia clearly shows a general rise in the social trust 
among all age-groups from 1996-2007. The dispersion between the different age-groups becomes 
bigger through time in Slovenia. As such the biggest differences in social trust in 2007 apparently 
are between the youngest group the 18 – 29 year olds (34 %), and the second youngest group the 30 
– 39 year olds (45 %). The pensioners are not less trusting than other groups, as they are in Croatia. 
At first glance a similar unambiguous development doesn't seem to be apparent in Croatia. For three 
age-groups (-29, 30-39 and 50-59) the development more or less seems to be characterised as status 
quo. The pensioners gradually become less trusting, while the 40-49 start out as the most trusting 
group in the first two datasets becoming just as little trustful as the pensioners in the last dataset. 
Because there are eleven years between the 1996-sample and the 2007-sample the same people can't 
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be said to belong to the same age-group in the whole figure. The mistrusting 40-49 year olds in the 
last sample are thus mainly the 30-39 year olds in the two earlier samples. 
The apparent status quo among the majority of the age-groups in Croatia maybe hides a real 
decline. As before mentioned the 2007 social trust score potentially has a positive bias. In that case 
the small Croatian decline in this year is even more remarkable, and maybe the reality is a much 
steeper decline in their score. To sum up the development in social trust more or less seems to be an 
all age group phenomenon in both countries.  
Secondly we look at employment status-groups in Slovenia and Croatia and their level of social 
trust. 
Figure 2. Social trust among employment status- groups in Slovenia and Croatia  
Slovenia Croatia 
Figure 2 shows the level of social trust among different employment status-groups in Slovenia and Croatia in 1996, 1999 and 2007. 
Source: WVS 1996, EVS 1999 and ISSP 2007. 
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Figure 2 shows that the development in social trust in Slovenia among employment status-groups 
has been a general rise from 1996-2007. The unemployed have had the smallest rise and are in 2007 
the group which is least trustful.   
At a first glance the development in Croatia doesn’t seem quite as clear as in Slovenia. The full 
timer workers, students, retired and the housewives all become less trusting from 1996-2007. The 
part timer workers have a small rise in their trust score from 1996-2007. However taking the 
positive bias in 2007 in consideration the rise is too small to be an actual rise in the groups social 
trust score. This should also be taking into consideration when looking at the development in 
Slovenia. Perhaps the rise in social trust in Slovenia from 1996-2007 is not as markedly as seen 
when looking at the figure.  
To sum up when looking at employment status-groups none of them in either Slovenia and Croatia 
seem to stand out markedly from the tendency and the development thus also seems to include all 
groups.      
Thirdly we look at different educational groups in Croatia and Slovenia and their level of social 
trust.   
  12
Figure 3. Social trust among educational groups5 in Slovenia and Croatia 
Slovenia Croatia 
 
Figure 3 shows the level of social trust among different educational groups in Slovenia in 1996, 1999 and 2007. Source: WVS 1996, 
EVS 1999 and ISSP 2007.  
 
Figure 3 shows that when looking at different educational groups in Slovenia there doesn’t seem to 
be any movement from 1996-2007 in their social trust scores. All the different educational groups 
seem more or less to have the same level of social trust in 1996 as in 2007. It is however quite 
interesting that the ‘secondary school group’ has a markedly higher level of social trust in the hole 
period. However as mentioned the different education groups in the figure are combined by 
                                                            
5 The tree different datasets have different educational groups. Therefore the group ‘No formal education’ is in WVS 1996 combined 
by the two values ‘No formal education’ and ‘incomplete primary school’, in EVS 1999 the group is the value ‘inadequate education’ 
and in ISSP 2007 the group is the value ‘no formal education’. The group ‘Primary school’ is in WVS 1996 the value ‘complete 
primary school’, in EVS 1999 the group is combined by the values ‘complete compulsory education’ and ‘elementary education’ and 
in ISSP 2007 the group is the value ‘lowest formal education’. The group ‘secondary school’ is in WVS 1996 combined by the 
values ‘complete secondary: technique’ and ‘complete secondary: university-pre’, in EVS 1999 the group is combined by the values 
‘2nd intern vocational qualification’, ‘2nd intern general qualification’ and ‘full 2nd maturity level certificate’ and in ISSP 2007 the 
group is combined by the values ‘above lowest qualification’ and ‘higher secondary completed’. The group ‘Above secondary 
school’ is in WVS 1996 the value ‘some university-level education’, in EVS 1999 the group is the value ‘higher educational- lower 
lever’ and in ISSP 2007 the group is the value ‘higher educational upper-level’. The group ‘University’ is in WVS 1996 the value 
‘University-level education‘, in EVS 1999 the group is the value ‘higher education upper-level’ and in ISSP 2007 the group is the 
value ‘university degree completed’ 
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different values in the three datasets, and therefore the differences between the different education 
groups can be random and hence cannot be completely valid.  
When looking at different educational groups in Croatia not much movement can be seen in the 
different groups social trust scores from 1999 to 2007. Unfortunately data is missing from 1996.  
However a little rise is seen when looking at the ‘primary school group’. This is quite remarkable 
but this can be an explanation of why we do not see a larger decline in Croatia’s social trust score 
from 1999 to 2007 in general. A little decline is seen when looking at the two groups ‘university’ 
and ‘above secondary school’, while there are no movement when looking at the groups ‘no formal 
education’ and ‘secondary school’. The educational group ‘secondary school’ is as seen in Slovenia 
the group which has the highest level of social trust in the whole period.  
To sum up when looking at educational groups in Slovenia and Croatia not much movement is seen 
in either of the two countries. None of the groups in the two countries seem to have a large rise or 
decline in the period and the development can therefore be said to include all groups 
In conclusion when disaggregating Croatia's and Slovenia's social trust scores among age-groups, 
employment status-groups and educational groups it is seen: That the development in social trust 
Slovenia and Croatia encompasses the two societies as a whole and cannot be subscribed to 
individual-level factors. This is seen because none of the different groups have a development in 
social trust which stands markedly out from the other groups.                        
Theory	
As shown above, the diversified development in social trust in Croatia and Slovenia 1996-2007 
cannot be subscribed to individual level factors. Hence a look at the broader context seems relevant. 
Existing context-based explanations about the roots of social trust emphasize equilibrium and 
stability though.  
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Uslaner argues that social trust is a moral norm, a norm that is founded during childhood and stable 
over the life course [Uslaner 1998, 2001, 2002]. Also Putnam [1993, 2000] sees social trust as 
stable. He argues that in areas with a civic community i.e. areas with strong, dense and horizontal 
networks and with tolerant and engaged people, people will be socialized to have a high amount of 
social trust. These civic communities are stable and the formations of these are traced to the 
eleventh century [Putnam 1993]. Rothstein, though not emphasizing socialization as the trust 
creating mechanism, insists that the universalistic welfare states in Scandinavia creates equality 
both objective economic equality, but also promoting an equality of opportunity. This fosters a high 
level of social- as well as political- and institutional trust. Hence the Scandinavian countries are in a 
state of a positive equilibrium harvesting the fruits of well functioning institution, whereas the post-
communist countries are caught in a negative equilibrium – a social trap of low social-, institutional 
and political trust [Rothstein 2000; Rothstein and Stolle 2001; Rothstein and Stolle 2007; Rothstein 
and Uslaner 2005]. 
As it is shown above existing context-based explanations of social trust by Uslaner, Putnam and 
Rothstein all emphasize stability and equilibrium. The Croatian and Slovenian development is 
clearly not one of stability though. The individual level explanations on the other hand do not hold 
much prominence either; the development in social trust in both countries is encompassing the 
society in general and not just specific groups. This poses a paradox; the existing theory does not 
seem to be able to explain the empirical development in the two countries.  
Consequently what is needed and what this paper suggests is a context-based explanation of social 
trust that allows for relatively rapid changes in social trust. This said the point is not to dismiss the 
insights that other authors writing about social trust have presented. The argument about public 
sentiment that will be presented in the following is thus to a high extent a synthesis of already 
existing knowledge. The paper’s argument will be presented in the following. 
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Equality	of	opportunity,	horizontal	relations	and	uncorrupted	politicians		
One factor that stands out as important in generating and maintaining social trust in a society is 
different forms of equality. The first form worth mentioning is what Rothstein denotes equality of 
opportunity. Putnam [1993] thus describes how the provinces of southern Italy are characterised by 
clientelism, mistrust and corruption because the societies are dominated by vertical relations. On the 
other hand in the civic communities in northern Italy horizontal relations dominate making the 
citizens: “…helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on matters of 
substance” [Putnam 1993: 88].  
In the societies where the vertical relations dominate an equality of opportunity clearly is not 
present; the privileged classes have a clear advantage in opportunities compared to the less 
privileged. They have money to bribe public officials and others with, they can ask favours and get 
advantages using their network. The less privileged on the other hand often have to rely on help 
from more privileged persons than themselves – either financially or by putting a word in for them. 
But by accepting these good favours you at the same time put yourself in some kind of debt to the 
helper. This mechanism is exactly what characterises and nurses the vertical structure of these 
societies [Putnam 1993; Rothstein 2005]. 
Rothstein points to the same features although focussing on the public sector. His argument is that 
the actions of public officials are seen as a yardstick for how people in the society acts in general. 
Hence in societies where people experience a fair, just, transparent and uncorrupted treatment from 
the public officials, a belief that not only the public officials, but also everybody else in the society, 
will act to enhance the common good. This creates social trust. In societies where the public 
officials are corrupt, and you are dependent on contacts – vertical relationships – this positive circle 
does not exist [Rothstein 2000; Rothstein and Stolle 2001; Rothstein and Stolle 2007; Rothstein and 
Uslaner 2005]. 
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Quite solid theoretical grounds thus exist to claim, that the social trust is related to societies 
characterised by a high degree of an equality of opportunity for the citizens. This said, two 
specifications of the above are in order. Firstly the behaviour of the politicians seems relevant as 
well. Supplementing Rothstein’s argument that citizens infer experiences with public officials to 
perceptions on the trustworthiness of the people in the society in general. The elected parliamentary 
politicians could to an even higher extent be seen as the yardstick of the state of the public 
trustworthiness. As Abraham Lincoln said in his famous Gettysburg address: “…and that 
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth” [Lincoln 
1863]. If the politicians who are elected to represent the society, to take care of the country’s future 
and the taxes everybody has paid, are not to be trusted - and if even they are corrupt, then how can 
people trust the ordinary people in the society?  
The second specification deals with the nature of the equality of opportunity statement. For Putnam 
and Rothstein the general characteristics - of the relations of the society being vertical or horizontal, 
or the treatment the public officials in a country gives its citizens - seems to be rather objectively 
understood. It is no wonder that Putnam and Rothstein ends up emphasising stability and 
equilibrium, since these general characteristics probably do not change markedly over relatively 
short time intervals. But we would argue that it is both the actual functioning of the public sector 
that is important, but also how it is perceived to function that matters. This perceived dimension is 
especially apparent in connection with the politicians.  
People in the society cannot know for sure, if the politicians are acting incorrupt, honestly and on 
behalf of the common good. But they do have bits of information from the media about how the 
politicians act. The media discourse can change rather fast and sometimes radically. Since media 
are the only source of information about the politicians for most people, it seems reasonable to 
suspect that if the media’s portrayal of the politicians changes abruptly, it should have some effect 
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on people’s view of the politician’s trustworthiness and thus social trust. In case of a change to a 
more negative media discourse regarding the honesty of the elected politicians, the public sentiment 
also becomes more negative. 
To sum up it is argued that the insights of Rothstein and Putnam can be supplemented. Firstly it is 
not only the public official’s but also the elected politician’s actions are relevant. Secondly both the 
perceived behaviour and nature of politicians and public officials are relevant, as well as their actual 
actions. Taking these modifications into consideration, and thus connecting the development in 
social trust with the changing public sentiment, social trust can be seen as having a much more 
volatile and contingent nature, than Rothstein, Uslaner and Putnam forecasts. 
How can these theoretical insights be used empirically then? Firstly, the political development 
needs to be surveyed. It is clear that especially grand corruption scandals among politicians must 
have an effect. But not only these big events can have an effect; if the country for a long period is 
mismanaged by politicians, that you had high expectations for, you will loose the faith in the 
politicians and hence the public sentiment will worsen. Contrary if the expectations for the 
politicians are not high, and despite these the country seems to be managed good enjoying 
successes, the faith in the politicians and the public sentiment will improve. Secondly, it is of course 
not only the political development that is important. The behaviour of the political institutions and 
the public officials are also important in this respect. If corrupt politicians in general are put to 
justice, then the negative effect on the public sentiment and social trust is maybe not so big. Survey 
indicators measuring political and institutional trust in capsule this contextual development.  
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Equality,	a	positive	economic	and	social	development	and	optimism	
Since public sentiment can be said to be a term for how people in the society perceive the country’s 
current situation, it is obvious that any investigations of such should include the economic and 
social situation of the country as well. 
Not just perceived equality of opportunity seems important for generation social trust in societies. 
Economic equality, and more generally good social and economic conditions for people in a society 
in general, actually seem to be more or less of a prerequisite for a high degree of social trust. This 
seem to be the case both on the individual level, where “the less-privileged” in societies always 
seem to have a lower degree of social trust scores than the rest of the population [Guldbrandtsen 
2001; Albrekt Larsen 2007; Skov Henriksen 2008]6. It also seems to be the case in aggregate level 
analysis, where the degree economic equality in societies – often measured with the Gini-coefficient 
– is often the strongest predictor of country-differences in social trust [Delhey and Newton 2005; 
Uslaner 2001; Albrekt Larsen 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009]. 
It seems obvious that should a country over a relatively short period experience a markedly 
deteriorating social and economic situation and rising inequality, the public sentiment should be 
affected in the negative direction. The question is: can these short time changes affect social trust? 
As the case was above, the existing literature on this point have a kind of stability-bias. Uslaner 
[2001] thus explains intergenerational differences in USA in social trust with differences in the 
different cohort’s economic conditions or more specifically ability to earn noticeably more than 
their parents [Uslaner 2001]. Albrekt Larsen [2007] argues that whether a culturally distinct 
underclass exists in a society or not is of fundamental importance for the degree of social trust of 
                                                            
6 See the tables above also. 
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that society. The general social stratification-pattern in a society should in anything but extreme 
cases be relatively stable over short time periods, why his equality-claim also inhibits a short term 
stability-bias. 
This bias could possibly be overcome, by combining the arguments with another factor, which is 
found to correlate with social trust – optimism. Uslaner thus claims that social trusters 
optimistically believe the world is a good place, which can be made an even better place by the 
effort of oneself as well as others [Uslaner 2001: 2-4]. He also finds that different indicators of 
optimism at the individual level correlate with social trust. But, optimism is according to Uslaner a 
very stable personal characteristic of a person.  Being an optimistic person or not is a part of ones 
moralistic trust, which is build on norms founded in the childhood not varying over time.  
Although Uslaner could be right that some people in general are more optimistic than others about 
the future, in a common sense understanding of the concept, it seems reasonable to claim it varies. 
On more theoretical grounds, other traditions in the literature about social trust also claims that 
whether people think other people in general can be trusted or not is actually based on more or less 
rational evaluations based on past experiences [Hardin 2002; 2006; Guldbrantsen 2001]. Thus 
experiencing a rapidly deteriorating economic and social situation of your country should ceteris 
paribus affect whether you are optimistic or not. The state of public sentiment could also be seen as 
the state of optimism for the society, why the two concepts are closely related.  
How can the above insights be used empirically then? Firstly the economic and social development 
of the countries needs to be surveyed – we will look at the development in the unemployment and 
the Gini-coefficients of the countries. While economic equality and a positive social development 
should lead to an improving public sentiment and a rising social trust, a rising inequality and a 
deteriorating social and economic situation should correspond with a negative development in 
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public sentiment. This is almost the same as saying that the optimism of the country will lower. 
Survey-indicators of optimism often tap a very individual concept of optimism though [see Uslaner 
1998, 2001, 2002; Lolle and Torpe 2009]: Stating how happy you are, or if you are satisfied with 
your life should be connected to the developments in public sentiment in a country. But these 
questions are also related to much more individual circumstances. Therefore it can be expected, that 
the optimism-indicators can be connected with the public sentiment, but on the other hand these 
indicators are also affected by circumstances on a more individual level. As a result they are not 
tapping the society based public sentiment completely7. 
Analysis	
So what characterises Croatia and Slovenia in the period 1996-2007? How has the political, 
institutional, social and economical context developed in the two countries? And what about the 
political and institutional trust as well as the general state of optimism in the two populations? The 
following two sections in turn deals with respectively the political and institutional dimension of 
public sentiment presented in the section “equality of opportunity, horizontal relations and 
uncorrupted politicians”. Afterwards the social and economical dimension of public sentiment 
presented in the section “equality, a positive economic and social development and optimism” will 
be dealt with. 
Transition	to	democracy	versus	rampant	nepotism	
In the following section the political development in Slovenia and Croatia will be surveyed. Both 
Slovenia and Croatia have undergone perceptible changes since their independence from 
Yugoslavia. First of all one important difference between the countries was how they gained their 
                                                            
7 In a factor analysis the optimism indicators, the general state of happiness, satisfaction with life and feeling of control over your 
life, correlate. KMO is 0,613, Cronbach’s Alpha is 0,661 and clearly just one component is extracted. cf. Appendix. 
This common optimism dimension also correlates significantly with social trust. The correlation between the social trust dummy and 
the optimism index is highly significant (p‹0.001) and Pearson’s r is 0.055.  
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independence. Slovenia had just 10 days of war, while Croatia experienced a long and gruesome 
war from 1991 to 1995. Croatia’s social trust score is as seen above higher than Slovenia’s in 1996. 
An explanation could be that the Croatians were still in a state of war euphoria. They had just won 
the war and hence the public sentiment should be affected positively by this. The euphoria did not 
seem to last though. 
In both Croatia and Slovenia the former socially owned companies have been privatised. However 
this process has been done in different ways. The privatisation in Croatia has been done in a way 
where some groups in the society have been given preferential treatment at the expense of the rest 
of the population. Friends of the former ruling party HDZ became owners of most of the biggest 
companies because of their connections with the party. This created a new class of so-called tycoon 
capitalists. They were not able to create the expected improvements of the Croatian economy. The 
companies didn’t become internationally competitive and all values were drained from the 
companies [Bartlett 2003: 92-111]. HDZ and the so-call tycoon capitalists can be said to have a big 
part of the responsibility of the economical and social crises the country were in, starting in the end 
of the nineties. The economical and social crises will be portrayed in the next section.   
The privatization in Slovenia happened in a totally different way. The process has been slow and 
the main purpose for the country was to maintain the social cohesion in the country. The process 
has not been beneficial for either insiders as in Croatia or foreign outsiders as in many other post 
communistic countries. Instead it was very clear what the values of the former collective owned 
companies was spent on and a part of it was even distributed directly to the entire population [Zajc 
1997: 170; Cox 2005: 147-149].         
Additionally Slovenia has often been described as one of the most free, stable and democratic 
countries in CEE [Cox 2005: 117-124 + 145]. Contrary Croatia’s former president Tudjman and his 
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party HDZ have often been seen as quite authoritarian. For instance Tudjman tried to implement 
restrictions on the freedom of the press [Bartlett 2003: 50-51]. 
The development in Slovenia is thus described in a very positive way, while the opposite is the case 
for Croatia. It is however interesting if this can be captured in the way Slovenians and Croatians 
perceive the institutions in their countries. Hence measures of trust in public institutions, public 
officials and politicians will be examined in the following. First indexes constructed from scores of 
trust in various political institutions will be examined. 
Table 2. Trust in Political Institutions 
 3-5 (High) 6-7 8-9 10-12 (low) Mean (std.dev.) 
Slovenia      
WVS 1996 7 % 25 % 45 % 23 % 8,22 (1,84) 
EVS 1999 9 % 28 % 45 % 19 % 8,01 (1,88) 
Croatia      
WVS 1996 15 % 36 % 36 % 13 % 7,41 (1,99) 
EVS 1999 4 % 24 % 47 % 25 % 8,45 (1,81) 
The table is based on the percentage of Slovenians and Croatians trust in various political institutions. Trust in political institutions is 
measured by two indexes constructed, one for each survey. For WVS 1996 the variables used are: v137, confidence in: legal system, 
v141 confidence in: police and v144 confidence in: parliament. For EVS 1999 the variables used are: v205 confidence in: police, 
v206 confidence in: parliament and v212 confidence in: justice system. For Slovenia N = 931 (1996) and 946 (1999) and for Croatia 
N = 1109 (1996) and 967 (1999). 
 
Table 2 shows an incremental rise in the institutional trust in Slovenia from 1996 to 1999. The rise 
is so small that it is close to not being statistically significant. When looking at the variables 
constructing the index separately, it’s clear that the Slovenes trust in their legal system changes 
significantly. 35 percentage points are located in the two positive categories in the original four 
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point ordinal scaled variable in 1996, while this figure is 44 percentage points in 1999. The trust in 
the police and parliament don’t change significantly though8.  
Croatians institutional trust from 1996 to 1999 decreases quite notable. This is clearly illustrated 
when looking at the category ’10-12’. In 1996 13 percent of the Croatians have given that answer 
but in 1999 it is 25 percent – an increase of 12 percentage points. Compared to Slovenia people in 
Croatia in 1996 have a higher confidence in their political institutions. There is actually a quite 
notable difference between the two countries. In 1999 it is now Slovenia which has the highest 
confidence in their political institutions. The difference between the two countries is not quite as 
notable as in 1996 but it is still relatively marked.  
When looking at the variables in the indexes separately it is clear that Croatia’s trust decreases most 
to the parliament and legal/justice system. There is also a fall in the confidence to the police but it is 
not as notable as to the other two institutions9. The most diversified development between Croatia 
and Slovenia is thus in the trust in the justice system. This doesn’t seem surprising given Croatia’s 
nepotistic privatization process and the opposite in Slovenia. The development seems to be 
representative of justice and injustice. 
Unfortunately the questions about trust in political institutions were not asked in the ISSP 2006-
0710. Instead questions about trust in public officials and politicians were asked. They can be used 
as a proxy for the institutional trust question.   
                                                            
8 cf. appendix. 
9 cf. appendix. 
10 In Croatia and Slovenia ISSP 2006 and 2007 were collected simultaneously in 2007.  
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Table 3. Trust in public officials and politicians 
 4-7 (high) 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-20 (Low) Mean (std.dev.) 
Slovenia       
ISSP 2007 1 % 14 % 44 % 33 % 9 % 13,05 (2,56) 
Croatia       
ISSP 2007 0 % 6 % 30 % 45 % 19 % 14,37 (2,48) 
The table is based on the percentage of Slovenians and Croatians trust in public officials and politicians. Trust in public officials and 
politicians are measured by an index constructed via the following variables: v50 trust in civil servants, v58 Public officials deals 
fairly with people like me, v60 Politicians involved in corruption and v61 Public officials involved in corruption from the survey 
ISSP Role of Government 2006-07. For Slovenia N = 799 and for Croatia N = 895. 
 
Table 3 shows that the majority of the Slovenians and the Croatians are located in the lower end of 
the index indicating quite a low trust in public officials and politicians. However there is still a 
remarkable difference between the two countries. 64 percentage points of the Croatians has an 
index-score of between 14 and 20 – which is the lower end of the index. “Only” 42 percentage 
points of the Slovenians have given that answer. Additionally it is also remarkably that so few 
Croatians have confidence – only 6 percent have given an answer which indicates passably 
confidence in their public officials and politicians (the categories 4-10). 15 percent of the 
Slovenians have given an answer between 4-10.   
When comparing the variables constructing the index separately, the Slovenians are more trusting 
than the Croatians in each case except for the question about, if “the public officials deals fairly 
with people like me”. Both Croatians and Slovenians have lowest confidence in their politicians11. 
                                                            
11 cf. appendix 
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If we compare the indexes from 1996 and 1999 with the one from 2007 it is clear that the tendency 
from 1999 continues in 2007. The difference between Slovenia and Croatia in 1999 where the 
Slovenians seemed to have most confidence in their political institutions continues in 2007. Only 
here the difference between the two countries is more notable. A comparison is of course 
problematic because it is not the same index, however the tendency is quite clear – the Slovenians 
have more confidence than the Croatians. This indicates that the perceived behaviour and nature of 
politicians and public officials are indeed relevant and hence not only their actual actions.  
It seems clear, that the Slovenians have experienced a somewhat positive development in their 
institutional trust. Taking their privatization process into consideration this doesn’t seem surprising. 
Croatia has oppositely experienced a decrease in their institutional trust. Looking at the context this 
doesn’t seem strange. During this period the Croatians have experienced euphoria after winning 
their war of independence. This euphoria was however soon replaced by experiences of a 
privatization process influenced by nepotism and injustice.  
This indicates a positive development in Slovenia’s public sentiment and a negative development in 
Croatia’s. This will be examined further in the next section where Slovenia’s and Croatia’s 
economic and social development will be surveyed.         
Stability	and	prosperity	versus	disappointed	expectations	
Croatia and Slovenia have gone through a quite diversified economic and social development since 
they gained their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Croatia has had a much harder period of 
transition with great economic and social consequences, whereas Slovenia’s transition has been 
more painless. The employment rate and the development of the gini-coefficient in the two 
countries will illustrate that.     
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FIGURE 4. The development in the unemployment percentage and the Gini-coefficient in Croatia 
and Slovenia 1987-2007 
The unemployment percentage 1993-2007 The Gini-coefficient 1987-2007 
 
The Slovenian data for the years 1993-2007 are acquired from 
the “Statistical office of the Republic of Slovenia”. While the 
years 2008-2009 are acquired from the monthly bulletin from 
the Slovenian central bank. The Croatian data for the years 
1996-2009 are gathered from the Croatian national banks 
homepage. Data for the year 1995 is acquired in [Bartlett 2003: 
10).  
The Slovenian and Croatian data for the years 1987-2003 are 
acquired from the variable undp gini from the “Quality of 
Government” dataset [original source: UNPD 2004]. The 
Slovenian data for the years 2004-2006 are acquired from the 
”Statistical office of the Republic of Slovenia”. The Croatian 
data from the years 2004-2007 are acquired from Croatia’s 
”Central Bureau of Statistics”. For Croatia data for several years 
are missing. 
 
Figure 4 shows that the Croatian unemployment has been very fluctuating and very high in the 
whole period, while the Slovenian has been stable and low. The income-inequality in Croatia, 
measured in gini-coefficient, has also been higher and more fluctuating than in Slovenia. The 
unemployment and gini figures are only examples of the economical crisis which exploded in the 
late nineties in Croatia. Other symptoms of this economical and social crisis were a rapid rise in the 
amount of people living in poverty in Croatia, bank collapses and rising public expenditures caused 
by the many pensioners, war veterans and unemployed, who all had a right for public grants 
[Bartlett 2003: 92-125]. Slovenia has in general been a richer country than Croatia in the period. 
Their GDP/inhabitant was thus in 1998 10404 $ while Croatia’s in the same year was just 3960 $ 
[Cox 2005: 65-68 + 150]. As described in the last section the economic and social crisis in Croatia 
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in the late nineties was also connected with the big corruption scandals involving the ruling party 
HDZ and the tycoon capitalist, who managed to bankrupt a lot of the big former collectively owned 
companies with severe effects on the Croatian economy as a consequence. 
There is good reason to suspect that this much diversified social and economical development in the 
two countries in the period has left a diversified mark on the public sentiment as well. While the 
Croatians probably have had their expectations disappointed by being struck by mass 
unemployment and poverty after gaining independence, the Slovenians have been spared of these 
forms of crisis. As one of the only post communist countries in CEE, they have not had a big rise in 
the inequality and unemployment in their transition to a market economy. Instead of disappointed 
expectations they have experienced a number of successes crowned with the entry into EU in May 
2004.  
You could suspect that this diversified public sentiment development could have left a mark on 
different indicators of optimism - although it needs to be kept in mind that these indicators also tap 
non-societal individual circumstances. In the following it will be investigated if this assumption is 
correct. In identifying which variables to use as optimism indicators, Uslaner’s own measurement 
of the concept is used as an inspiration [Uslaner 1998: 3-7, 2001: 15-23, 2002 and Lolle and Torpe 
2009]. Three optimism indicators will be examined in the following.  
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TABLE 4. “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?” 
 Very Happy Quite Happy Not very Happy Not at all Happy Balance 
Slovenia      
WVS 1996 14 % 61 % 23 % 3 % 49 
EVS 1999 16 % 62 % 20 % 3 % 56 
ISSP 2007 16 % 64 % 18 % 2 % 61 
Croatia      
WVS 1996 9 % 62 % 27 % 3 % 40 
EVS 1999 14 % 68 % 16 % 2 % 64 
ISSP 2007 16 % 54 % 26 % 5 % 39 
The data is frequency distributions of the variables v10 in WVS 1996, v11 in EVS 1999 and v64 in ISSP 2007. The last row displays 
the opinion balances of the scores, which are calculated as the sum of the row one and two subtracted the sum of row three and four. 
For Slovenia: N = 998 (1996), 979 (1999) and 979 (2007). For Croatia: N = 1183 (1996), 992 (1999) and 1178 (2007). 
 
Table 4 displays a gradual positive development for Slovenia. 12 percentage points shifts from the 
two negative categories to the two positive categories from 1996 to 2007. This is reflected in the 
balance. The table also shows that the Croatian’s perception of how happy they are increases from 
1996 to 1999 and then decreases again from 1999 to 2007. In the period the Slovenians are 
generally happier than the Croatians, the difference being highest in 2007. The category ‘Quite 
happy’ illustrates this: 54 percent of the Croatians have given that answer whereas 64 percent of the 
Slovenians have given that answer.    
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TABLE 5. “All things considered, how satisfied with your life as a whole these days?” 
 1-4 (Low) 5-7 8-10 (High) Mean (std.dev.) 
Slovenia     
WVS 1996 15 % 51 % 34 % 6,46 (2,13) 
EVS 1999 10 % 36 % 54 % 7,23 (2,15) 
Croatia     
WVS 1996 21 % 48 % 32 % 6,18 (2,13) 
EVS 1999 16 % 42 % 42 % 6,68 (2,30) 
The data is frequency distributions of the variables v65 in WVS 1996 and v68 in EVS 1999. The variable originally has ten 
categories. The three boxes above are created to enhance the clarity of the table. The sum of the scores of respectively the categories 
1-4, 5-7 and 8-10 are shown. For Slovenia: N = 1000 (1996) and 1004 (1999). For Croatia: N = 1192 (1996) and 997 (1999). 
 
Table 5 also shows the same positive tendency for the Slovenians as table 4. Here the development 
is even more remarkable. 20 percentage points more are located in the highest category 8-10 in 
1999 than in 1996. Also the Croatians have become more positive from 1996-1999. The same was 
the case with their level of happiness. Unfortunately data from 2007 are missing but you could 
expect that the development would become more negatively from 1999 to 2007 as with their level 
of happiness12. The Slovenians are more satisfied with their lives both in 1996 and 1999 than the 
Croatians. Especially in 1999 there is a quite noticeable difference which can be illustrated when 
looking at the category ‘8-10’ where there is a difference of 12 percentage points.   
                                                            
12 Emphasizing this point; a factor analysis shows that the three questions measure the same concept, see appendix.  
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TABLE 6. “Indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your 
life turns out?” 
 1-4 (Low) 5-7 8-10 (High) Mean (std.dev.) 
Slovenia     
WVS 1996 13 % 41 % 46 % 6,89 (2,24) 
EVS 1999 6 % 40 % 51 % 7,17 (2,15) 
Croatia     
WVS 1996 17 % 46 % 39 % 6,49 (2,27) 
EVS 1999 10 % 44 % 46 % 7,04 (2,14) 
The data is frequency distributions of the variables v66 in WVS 1996 and v67 in EVS 1999. The variable originally has ten 
categories. The three boxes above are created to enhance the clarity of the table. The sum of the scores of respectively the categories 
1-4, 5-7 and 8-10 are shown. For Slovenia: N = 998 (1996) and 993 (1999). For Croatia: N = 1179 (1996) and 987(1999). 
 
Table 6 displays the same tendency as table 4 and table 5 above: More Slovenes locates in the 
highest category in 1999 than in 1996. The tendency is not as clear as in table 5 though. The 
Croatians again have a positive development from 1996 to 1999, which also was the case with the 
Croatians level of happiness and perception of how satisfied they were with their lives. Compared 
to Slovenians the Croatians to a little lesser extent have a have a feeling of control over their lives.  
The three tables generally express a positive development for both countries on the optimism-
indicators from 1996-1999. Unfortunately only the first presented question “Taking all things 
together, how happy would you say you are?” is asked in all three surveys. The tendency here is 
that the Slovenians continue their positive development becoming more optimistic in 2007 than in 
1999. The Croatians on the other hand are more pessimistic in 2007 than in 1999. Assuming the 
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other two questions would show the same tendency if asked in 2007 as the first one, the 
development in optimism is what could be expected given the economical- and social, but also the 
political- and institutional development in the two countries in the period. 
Conclusion		
The case of Croatia and Slovenia has shown that it is possible to move the general level of social 
trust in a society in a period of just eleven years (1996-2007). Furthermore it seems that the 
tendency is very broad, encompassing all major social groups in the Slovenian and Croatian 
populations. This suggests that the explanation for the diversified development in social trust needs 
to be found in the broader context of the countries and not in individual circumstances. The existing 
literature about social trust emphasising contextual factors inhibit a stability-bias though. The 
Croatian and Slovenian development is paradoxical in this optic. What are needed to explain the 
development are therefore contextual explanations which are able to explain rather rapid changes in 
social trust. This paper argues that changes in public sentiment can explain such changes. The 
volatile nature of this concept indeed makes it possible to see social trust as more changeable. 
Empirically Croatia and Slovenia have had a much diversified development on relevant factors 
since 1996.  Slovenia seems to have experienced a successful transition towards a well functioning 
democracy with a slow, just and transparent privatisation process, no big corruption scandals and a 
steady rise in the institutional trust. Croatia on the other hand quickly switched from euphoria after 
winning the war to experiences of a chaotic, nepotistic and opaque privatization process with big 
corruption scandals a more or less destroyed economy and a decreasing institutional trust. The 
Croatians have furthermore experienced a massive rise in unemployment and poverty, why the 
lowered optimism in 2007 can be seen as no surprise. The Slovenians have managed to keep a very 
low level of unemployment as well as an economically very equal society, something which is 
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almost unique in the post communist countries in CEE. Their optimism figures also show a 
tendency for a steady but gradual rise in the whole period.  
It seems safe to conclude that the Croatians after a number of disappointments must have 
experienced a negative development in their public sentiment after about the year 2000, while the 
Slovenians on the other hand have experienced a number of successes crowned with the EU-
membership in 2004. This should have led to a constant positive development in their public 
sentiment. This could be one of the explanations of the diversified and rather rapid changes in the 
two countries general level of social trust. 
A huge amount of literature point to the beneficial effects of a high amount of social trust and 
because it obviously can erode or be created in a relatively short time span, it seems imperative with 
further research. This research must try to unravel the dynamic factors which spur the erosion or 
creation of social trust.   
This point is even more relevant in a CEE context where the post-communist countries struggle 
with their transitions to create well functioning democratic societies and stable economic growths –  
something which social trust often has been said to be a crucial prerequisite for.      
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Datasets		
European Value Study 3. wave 1999-2000  
ISSP Sport and Leisure 2007  
ISSP Role of Government 2006  
The Quality of Government dataset 
World Values Survey Eastern Europe 1995-1997 
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Appendix	
Factor analysis and reliability test of optimism indicators: the general state of happiness, 
satisfaction with life and feeling of control over your life 
Component Eigenvalues, total Eigenvalues, percent of 
variance 
KMO and 
Bartletts test 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
1 1,795 59,8 0,613*** 0,661 
2 0,732 24,4   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. * p< 0.05, **p< 0,01. *** p< 0.001 
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Crosstabs	–	confidence	in	different	political	institutions	in	Slovenia	and	Croatia		
1996 
Confidence in Legal system A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all 
Slovenia 7 % 28 % 48 % 16 % 
Croatia 10 % 42 % 42 % 7 / 
N = 2121 
Confidence in Police A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all 
Slovenia 9 % 38 % 42 % 11 % 
Croatia 15 % 46 % 33 % 6 % 
 N=2155 
Confidence in Parliament A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all 
Slovenia 3 % 22 % 52 % 23 % 
Croatia 10 % 32 % 44 % 15 % 
N=2099 
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1999 
Confidence in Justice system A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all 
Slovenia 11 % 33 % 42 % 14 % 
Croatia 4 % 27 % 50 % 19 % 
N = 1965 
Confidence in Police A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all 
Slovenia 9 % 41 % 41 % 9 % 
Croatia 6 % 41 % 43 % 11 % 
 N=1987 
Confidence in Parliament A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all 
Slovenia 5 % 20 % 53 % 22 % 
Croatia 3 % 17 % 54 % 25 % 
N=1944 
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2006 
Trust in Civil Servant Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Slovenia 2 % 24 % 31 % 30 % 13 % 
Croatia 1 % 10 % 28 % 35 % 27 % 
N = 2095 
Public officials deal fairly 
with people like me 
Almost Always Often Occasionally Seldom Almost Never 
Slovenia 12 % 27 % 33 % 21 % 6 % 
Croatia 15 % 26 % 32 % 18 % 9 % 
N=2026 
Politicians involved in corruption Almost none A few Some Quite a lot Almost all
Slovenia 1 % 6 % 36 % 46 % 11 % 
Croatia 0 % 4 % 18 % 48 % 30 % 
N=1953 
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Public officials involved in 
corruption 
Almost none A few Some Quite a lot Almost all
Slovenia 1 % 13 % 45 % 36 % 5 % 
Croatia 1 % 8 % 31 % 47 % 14 % 
N=1902 
